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1 Executive Summary 
 
The school of  project management has produced many aids that support the implementation 
phase of  projects, but support for the design phase is still lacking. This article is an 
exploratory study of  an application of  a new method of  supporting projects during the 
indistinct design phase. The method assumes that a ‘can-do’ attitude of  project managers 
make them tend to manipulate any formal review system during times of  great uncertainty, 
and deals with this through deploying confidential reviews aiming at a model of  reasoning 
proposed by Argyris and Schön (1978). Findings of  this study confirms that project 
managers are aware of  the power system in which their projects operate and that they are 
unwilling to share important but embarrassing information, such as their own lack of  
knowledge, to control systems and power holders. The implications of  this management of  
impressions for knowledge sharing are discussed. 
 
2 Introduction 
Many project management models rely on the assumption that project work unfolds 
in a logical sequence. This sequence prescribes that solutions are not to be identified 
until the problem has been clearly defined and the options have been compared and 
evaluated. Implementation should not begin until agreement has been reached as 
regards the solution. The key actors in the implementation process need clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities. Implementation is to be closely monitored and 
deviations from plan are to be detected and corrected. The implementation process 
is bounded in terms of  resources and time, with a clear project completion date. 
Unfortunately, organizations seem rarely to operate in such a tidy and predictable 
manner (Buchanan & Huczynski, 1997). 
The dominant view of  project management focuses on two main problems, the 
planning of  the project (the design phase) and its execution (the implementation 
phase) being in alignment with the plans (Engwall, 1995 pp184). However, calling for 
better planning and better estimation is not always the best solution (Sauer, Liu, & 
Johnston, 2001). The project work may be regulated by formal rules and audited via 
inspections and progress reports, but such project monitoring is subject to the 
influence of  the same power system as the project work itself  (Olin & Wickenberg, 
2001). Authors in the field of  organizational politics recognize that information, 
which challenges the decisions made, also threatens the power base of  the decision 
maker and will not be welcomed (Ortmark, 2000). The history is full of  examples of  
project failures, caused by unwise management decisions regarding overall product 
(or process) design during the early design phase of  the project, and where often vital 
knowledge and experience were available but not called for (Karlander, 2001). Well-
known examples of  this kind of  political mismanagement of  projects include the 
Challenger (Gleick, 1992) and Vasa (Kessler, Bierly, & Gopalakrishnan, 2001) 
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disasters. In the case of  NASA, managers prioritised the political management of  the 
shuttle program, oppressing discussions regarding the potential failure of  
subsystems. In his report on the Challenger disaster, Nobel Prize laureate Feynman 
recognized that engineering and impression management are competing activities and 
concluded by warning that; “for a successful technology, reality must take precedence 
over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled” (Gleick, 1992 p428). 
This is an obvious but neglected paradox of  project management; as a project 
manager, you need to manage the inside, the development of  the product (the 
project result), while at the same time needing to respond to external challenges and 
to compete for resources outside of  the project. The former activity calls for a 
rational view (of  ‘reality’ as Feynman puts it), while the latter may call for some 
management of  the impression of  the project being sent out to the project 
environment. Some project management writers recognize that some of  the 
manipulative (e.g. Sotiriou & Wittmer, 2001) and political (e.g. Pinto, 2000) tactics of  
the project manager can be used constructively. An example of  such ‘moderate’ 
political behaviour follows. The author of  this paper was once told by an experienced 
project manager that, in order to make management recognize her talent, every once 
in a while she deliberately mismanaged some risks so that she needed to report them 
to the project’s steering group (“let them hear it crack a little” as she put it) before 
taking care of  the risks. She explained her behaviour by saying that “management 
doesn’t appraise you by what you do, but by what they know that you do”. Project 
managers recognize that they must attend to the different problems of  their projects, 
while at the same time having to manage the façade of  performance and 
achievements shown to management. In projects are the rational and the political 
irrevocably intertwined (Buchanan & Boddy, 1992). 
This paradox, of  the objective inside versus the subjective outside management of  
projects, creates some dilemmas. (i) One is the need for the project manager to use 
two different mental agendas regarding work, one objective and one subjective. 
Viewing the world via multiple perspectives is a rare practice (Morgan, 1997) and one 
or the other might be underdeveloped by the project manager. (ii) A second dilemma 
is that the subjective agenda, when used by the project manager to protect the project 
from unwanted outside influence, might also suppress indications of  major problems 
on the inside of  the project. This will allow the problems to escalate in such a way 
that they might get out of  hand before the project manager reports them. (iii) A third 
is that it is difficult for management to create supporting instruments and methods 
which help project managers to manage secret agendas, since public acceptance of  
the existence of  different agendas would legitimise resistance to the influence of  the 
project environment and its management. 
This study presents an emerging project management method, Project Initiation Audit, 
or PIA for short. It was designed to support the project manager in managing the 
first dilemma, the inside and outside agendas. It was deployed at the beginning of  the 
project, where uncertainty regarding the project is high, but where, according to 
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Karlander’s cases, many major design decisions are made in haste. Situations of  great 
uncertainty call for reflection and consideration by the project manager, which is the 
aim of  the PIAs. It is designed to side-step the second dilemma through feeding no 
information back to the project environment; it thus provides no grounds for 
increased influence and can be viewed as ‘friendly’ support by the project manager. 
Also, it is designed to avoid the third dilemma inasmuch as management, through 
deployment of  the method, only authorizes a kind of  mandatory project audit; no 
public recognition of  the existence of  different agendas needs to exist in such a 
deployment. 
This paper is divided as follows. The major principles of  project management theory 
are briefly described together with some of  its critics. Theories of  action are 
presented to explain why the common, rational approach of  analysing human 
behavior is unfit in certain situations, together with a few examples of  existing 
methods for ‘deeper’ learning. Then, the PIA method is described in the terms by 
which it was presented to the management of  the studied organization, and then 
excerpts are given from recorded narratives by those involved in the PIA audits (PMs 
and the auditor). The Results section summarizes how the PIA method deals with the 
three dilemmas described above, and finally the implications of  the findings are 
discussed. 
3 Theories of Project Management 
Proper project execution is usually monitored through the application of  steering 
groups, reviews and toll gates, all designed to prevent the project from deviating 
from its plan, set within its trio of  limits; i.e. time, resources and functionality 
(Engwall, 1995). Project managers are taught to respect the project’s demarcations, 
not to doubt the relevance of  the project’s objectives, just the path set to achieve 
them. It is the project’s customers and their representatives who care about the 
relevance of  the objectives (Kreiner, 1995). 
Unique work is difficult to standardize. Research performed by Ekvall (2000) 
indicates that the application of  standard management methods to projects might 
restrict the projects’ abilities to innovate. The project management school has been 
criticized for viewing projects as tools and not as organizations, thereby failing to 
recognize their ability to learn (Packendorff, 1995) and innovate (Hatchuel, Masson, 
& Weil, 2001). Innovation usually occurs during the design phase, which practitioners 
of  project management have a tendency to rush past (Turner & Cochrane, 1993; van 
den Honert, 1992). Apart from offering an opportunity for innovation, a well-
performed project start-up is important since it improves understanding of  the 
project’s overall purpose, scope and objectives (Halman & Burger, 2002). A few 
mechanistic approaches have been applied to the design phase; the stage-gate model 
was designed to prevent premature commitment to designs which have not been 
sufficiently appraised (Cooper, 1988; Hosking & Morley, 1991). Some design 
decisions may nevertheless have to be based on uncertain grounds when stage-gate 
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meetings turn into arenas not for information-sharing but for impression-making 
(Cooper, 1999). Bad decisions made early on during the execution of  a project are 
unfortunately difficult to change, since the decision-makers tend to stick more rigidly 
to the chosen path after a serious investment has been made (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 
1981). Hellgren and Stjernberg (1995) found that the initial design phase of  
important projects is “fuzzy” and hard to capture, as opposed to the implementation 
phase, which is of  a more hierarchical and plannable nature. In fact, Nobelius and 
Trygg (2002) argue that there is little use in trying to standardize the design phase, 
and that there is a need for more managerial flexibility during this phase. Olin and 
Wickenberg (2001) found that project managers of  new product development 
projects might need to take some political action in order for their projects to be 
successful; they need to navigate their projects past obstacles created by the 
administration of  their own companies. Alas, the project management school has so 
far failed to provide appropriate tools for the design phase of  projects. Critics of  the 
school of  project management argue that it is of  little use to apply the mechanistic 
formal planning approach to the early phases of  projects (Hellgren & Stjernberg, 
1995; Nobelius & Trygg, 2002), and that managing uncertainty, through mastering 
the politics of  the project context, is the essential thing for the project’s, and the 
project manager’s, success (Buchanan & Badham, 1999). This calls for project 
methods which recognize the project manager as an actor in a network of  different 
interest holders. 
4 Theories for action and learning 
Humans do not fully see things as they are in actuality. One reason for this distortion 
of  reality is that the external stimuli recognized by our senses are compared to schemas 
(action theories) stored in our memories; the appropriate perception of  the schema 
suddenly pops into our awareness. Like a theory, a schema embodies assumptions, 
which we take as givens with complete confidence. This lets us make interpretations 
that outstrip the immediate evidence from our senses. This cognitive shorthand lets 
us navigate our way through the ambiguity which is, more often than not, what we 
confront in the world (Goleman, 1986). One important area of  distortion is our own 
actions. Argyris and Schön (1978) call our view of  how we act espoused theories and 
how we really act theories-in-use. The distortion, i.e. the difference between the 
espoused theories and the theories-in-use, is greater under some circumstances than 
others. While day-to-day work creates a low level of  distortion, uncertain issues 
which are embarrassing or threatening increase it. Distortion creates a dilemma; on 
the one hand, we don’t want to be immobilized by giving too much attention to our 
actions, while on the other, our actions are likely to be ineffective. The irony is that 
we are aware of  other people’s inconsistencies while they are producing them, and we 
are aware that they are unaware. We are not particularly effective in helping others to 
gain awareness, and we are unaware of  our own ineffectiveness while trying to be of  
help (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985). 
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According to Argyris (1990), members of  organizations are prevented from learning 
because of  defensive reasoning and routines, especially occurring during threatening 
situations. This way of  thinking includes the three action values; seek to be in 
unilateral control, win, and do not upset people. These strategies, which Argyris 
labels Model I reasoning, are often enacted in a quick and skilled way, making its 
actors unaware of  what is going on and preventing any inquiry which could have 
created a better understanding. In order to support learning, actors need to replace 
Model I reasoning with Model II reasoning, which consists of  two action strategies; 
advocate your position and encourage inquiry or confirmation of  it (by making 
public the reasoning that led us to our standpoint), and minimize our face-saving of  
others (thereby increasing feedback on distortion). Thus; Argyris’ argument is that if  
we can create a climate where we can abandon Model I reasoning in favour of  Model 
II, we will better be able to help each other reduce distortion, i.e. our understanding 
of  which actions we really perform, thereby increasing the efficiency of  our actions.  
Several methods have been developed based on learning through reflection. In Action 
science a mentor supports a group of  subjects in analysing past social events in order 
to increase reflection upon what has occurred and help them develop alternative 
actions in such situations (Argyris et al., 1985). Action science is criticized for, among 
other things, exposing participants and making them vulnerable following 
intervention (Kemmis & McTaggart, 2000). Ollila  describes an application of  a 
reflective coaching method, Reflective Project Leadership, based on Schön (1991), where 
the actions of  a project manager are questioned by an observer. Ollila reports that 
initially the responses of  the project manager are swift, but after a few sessions, he 
starts to reflect upon why he is taking certain actions. The observer refuses to give 
any kind of  advice, instead the manager is asked to reflect upon why certain actions 
triggered certain responses from other actors. Reflective project leadership aims to 
create reflection using the non-initiated observer as a catalyst. However, reflection 
does not necessarily require interaction with other people; the writing of  self-reflective 
journals is one example of  such a method (Loo & Thorpe, 2002). 
5 Method 
This article describes a project management method, tried out by the author of  this 
article. The author has also been acting as the ‘auditor’ in all PIAs performed so far. 
Thus, it is more of  a self-ethnographic study performed by an insider than action 
science performed by an outsider (Bartunek & Louis, 1996). As the author is very 
close to the studied phenomenon, there is a high risk of  bias and distortion. This 
subjectivity needs to be managed in a disciplined way (Rendahl, 1992). A self-
narrative was recorded in order to better understand the phenomenon. As Schön 
puts it, “awareness of  one’s intuitive thinking usually grows out of  practice in 
articulating it to others” (Schön, 1991 p243). Excerpts from this narrative will be 
presented in italics, as are excerpts from the interviews. Two other researchers were 
invited to validate the analysis of  the study. 
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The purpose of  the empirical study was to investigate how the PIA method deals 
with the three dilemmas presented above; (i) is there a need for reflection regarding 
the items of  the project manager’s two agendas; (ii) do project managers accept the 
support of  the PIA auditor and is Model II reasoning achieved, and (iii) will 
management deploy PIAs? The data collection method was semi-structured 
interviews of  seven project managers and five line managers in the organization 
where PIAs were deployed. Three project audits and a self-narrative were recorded. 
Six of  the interviews were performed by another researcher who interpreted the data 
together with the author. A simple survey was conducted at a point used by 
management to benchmark the PIA method; the result will be reported on. 
Validation of  the interview process, i.e. investigating whether the collected data and 
its analysis were reliable, was done in three steps. The interviews included questions 
regarding the validity of  the interview series, and this data was analysed for its 
manifest content, again using the same procedure as when analysing the research 
questions. The second step was analysing the interview process itself. The author 
took on the role of  insider/colleague and listened from the beginning to the end of  
all the recorded interviews while asking himself  the question; ’do I believe these 
responses from this interviewee not to be coloured by my own involvement’. Finally, 
the interpretations were scrutinized by two fellow researchers. 
6 The PIA method 
The PIA method focuses on giving project managers a possibility to reason and 
reflect upon all issues of  their projects, including those that cannot be discussed 
openly. The basic idea is to create a dialogue climate where errors or obstacles can be 
discussed without loss of  face or performance of  organizational politics. The 
method was developed in an IT function at a pharmaceutical R&D company (The 
Company). The Company has grown from 1,000 to 2,000 employees over the seven 
years during which the method has been in use. Of  these employees, between 70 and 
160 have been working in the IT departments. About 80 PIAs have been performed 
in collaboration with about 50 different project managers, of  whom about a tenth 
have been contracted consultants. 
PIAs share the following characteristics: 
o Institutionalized by management in its existence, not its content 
o Performed during the early phase of  project execution 
o Takes less than two hours to perform 
o Staged for two participants; the project manager and the auditor 
o Unilaterally confidential (the auditor cannot disclose information) 
o The auditor is powerless and non-influential outside the PIAs  
o Aimed at creating reflection through Model II reasoning 
 
IT line management has ruled that a PIA is to be performed at the beginning of  each 
IT project, and have accepted that there is non-disclosure. Management knows the 
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PIA characteristics described above, but receives no report regarding what each audit 
covers; the only information agreed upon for disclosure is when individual project 
managers resist being audited. On an aggregated level, they may be informed of  
patterns of  project management dilemmas, this information also being made 
available to the IT quality assurance functions of  the company. The auditor is not to 
provide any information regarding the performance of  any individual project 
managers, and is in no position to exert any influence on projects outside of  the 
audits. 
7 An early evaluation  
After the expiry of  its first two years of  evaluation, management investigated the 
performance of  the PIAs using a simple survey consisting of  three questions (see 
Table 1). The questionnaire was sent to those IT project managers who had 
experienced PIAs and who answered the call made by the person performing the 
study. Fourteen project managers were absent or failed to answer, with the response 
rate for the 16 who answered being 100%. 
Table 1 – Results of  the PIA questionnaire (# of  respondents) 
In what way did PIA affect 
your task? 
Yes, definitely 
Yes, to some 
extent 
No Unsure 
Did you experience improved 
control over your task? 
11 5 0 0 
Did your task become easier to 
perform? 
4 7 0 5 
Did the task result in improved 
customer profit? 
1 3 2 10 
 
Management interpreted this result as positive and institutionalised PIAs for 
performance during the initiation of  all IT projects. 
The interview series shows that management is supportive of  PIAs. One manager 
said that he authorized PIAs because they give project managers a second chance; 
project managers are “often flattered” when they are offered a new project and PIAs 
provide an opportunity to reflect upon the feasibility of  the project idea. A bad idea 
is easier to reject or improve if  the auditor has said ‘this project would be hard to 
conduct for anybody’. 
Managers explain their authorization of  PIAs in terms of  its ability to create 
reflection and support the project managers during the important early phase of  a 
project. Most managers mentioned that they trusted the project managers; one of  
them put it like this:  
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I believe the employees try to do their best, and if  [PIAs] are an unconventional way of  
helping them, well then I think it is a good idea to carry out [PIAs], compared to formal 
audits. [… Formal audits] make people feel scrutinized and they are not perceived as 
supportive. Helping the projects is what it’s all about. In the end, everything is about 
improving our results, our projects. 
8 The auditor’s view of PIAs 
The typical PIA is initiated by the project manager, who contacts the PIA auditor to 
make an appointment for an audit sometime during the initial weeks following the 
assignment of  the project. During that call, the auditor makes sure that the project 
manager is informed as regards how a PIA is performed, also asking for any 
documents describing the project. The common document for this purpose is the 
‘Project Description’, which states the name of  the client ordering the project, the 
purpose and effects of  the project together with the proposed staffing, and 
descriptions of  identified dependencies and project risks. 
Before the meeting, the PIA auditor reviews the documents and makes marginal 
notes of  obscurities as well as the perceived strengths and weaknesses of  the project 
initiative. 
When the audit starts, the auditor makes sure that the project manager is aware of  
the purpose of  the audit and that the auditor is subject to unilateral confidentiality. 
The purpose of  the audit is to improve the project manager’s awareness of  the 
characteristics of  the project assignment by means of  exposing the proposed project 
(and program) design to the different perspectives of  another mind. In order to do 
this effectively, the auditor mainly focuses on the potential weaknesses of  the project 
design.  
The project manager is asked to describe what is happening as regards the project. 
This description usually takes between five and twenty minutes and covers most of  
the project description document. The auditor will listen for cues concerning any 
problems or worries which the project manager has as regards the project.  
From this point on, there is no standard flow of  dialogue. Two paths are eventually 
trodden; the auditor will investigate the concerns of  the project manager, and 
elucidate any remaining concerns of  his/her own. Only sometimes do these paths 
cross. The auditor tries to strike a balance between inquiry and advocacy, depending 
on the perceived strengths and weaknesses of  the project manager. The overall 
purpose of  all inquiry is to allow the project manager to reflect over each important 
design decision, and that he/she has identified a few alternatives for each major 
choice. Occasionally, the project manager has already reflected and is well aware of  
the alternatives. At other times, the project manager has not reflected, sticking to 
taken-for-granted project designs. Reflection is created through questioning the 
chosen path and comparing it with other possible paths (“Tell me why you chose… 
What will happen if  … Have you considered … “) 
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Concerns raised by the project manager are usually obstacles to project initiation or, 
more frequently, project execution, e.g. “How can I get them to understand that…” 
or “A member of  the steering committee is resisting my project…”. Typical concerns 
of  the auditor include the overall project design, dependencies, risk management, and 
most importantly, where the concerns of  the project manager lie. 
The intention of  the unilateral secrecy of  the PIAs is twofold. Its intention is to 
encourage project managers to be honest about the state of  their projects and to 
avoid any embarrassment. It also seeks to improve innovation; any idea that is 
created during an audit can be used by the project manager as his/her own, 
regardless of  which of  the participants invented it. The secrecy is unilateral in that 
the project manager can conclude any part of  the audit at his/her own discretion. I 
remember an audit when the project manager and I tried to figure out what the customer of  this 
process-change project really wanted the project to do. It took us almost half  an hour of  analysing 
the project directives to realize that there was no reasonable product to provide. The project customer 
had provided a heap of  management mumbo-jumbo that initially fooled us both. The project 
manager returned to the customer with the argument that neither of  us could find a meaningful path 
for running the project. I think that this would have been a less pleasant message to deliver, had the 
project manager lacked support of  others. The fact that PIAs are institutionalised may help 
us to avoid embarrassment here; the project manager has not asked anybody for a 
second opinion, but has been forced into it.  
A relevant question to ask is whether or not the confidentiality really makes a 
difference. You could say that most of  the things we talk about could be made public, things which 
wouldn’t embarrass or hurt anyone. But I think that the overall confidentiality is one reason why 
project managers let go of  their defensiveness and end their attempts to make a good impression. 
Only a few project managers have discussed things clearly needing to be kept secret from people 
outside of  the project, for the overall good of  the project. But there is a grey zone of  topics which are 
not necessary to keep secret but which would cause a stir if  they became public, e.g. how to handle 
relations with those in power and how to persuade hesitant people to support the project. And, of  
course, most project managers seem to maintain a can-do image. 
Three times, project managers have brought a project member to the PIA with bad 
results. I remember the first time – the audit turned into a disaster. It was the only time the 
discussion became argumentative, when we ended up arguing, defending our positions. The project 
manager and I have collaborated well, both before and after this incident, so it was not about a clash 
of  personalities. I think the presence of  a third person set the scene for a battle of  pride, both his 
and mine. I thought a lot about that afterwards and discussed the matter with the project manager – 
in private, this time. The other two times when there was a third person present, I took the 
opportunity of  checking that I would not repeat the mistakes of  the first incident. [The PIAs] 
didn’t work despite this, however. Face-saving behaviour by the project manager was evident, and no 
arenas for reflection were created. One of  these projects was critical, and I proposed a follow-up audit 
for that. It didn’t work, either. The project manager was a hired consultant whom I didn’t know, 
and the face-saving pattern set during our first meeting continued into the next. Perhaps she learnt 
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something behind that professional face, perhaps not. I believe it was the latter, as the project did not 
develop to its full potential. 
9 The project leaders’ view of the PIAs  
Audited project managers responded that PIAs had ’worked’ for them by ’helping’ 
them in their projects. They were all upbeat about the existence of  PIAs. However, 
when they were asked an open question regarding the purpose of  PIAs, the answers 
varied. One respondent said that the purpose of  PIAs is to “let you discuss your ideas and 
get help in writing up the requirements specification before starting the project. It’s to give you a green 
light, that everything is okay.” Another person responded, “it’s to avoid risks, to avoid 
forgetting things”. One answer was “to get the chance to clarify things with a neutral person, 
checking that you have put some thought into it, somebody neutral who is not involved”. Another 
said “it’s to get another pair of  eyes to look at the project specification and see things you have 
forgotten, for example missing risks, missing dependencies, or the project in its entirety, to question 
the different components of  your project”. 
The Company has a rule that all IT projects should have a steering group which the 
project manager reports to. This rule has been in place for several years. Respondents 
were asked if  PIAs offered the projects a different service to the one offered by the 
steering group. One project manager said that both timing and prestige were 
essential. 
 [PIAs] have a different purpose to the steering group. You can avoid the matter of  prestige, 
the necessity of  having to show the steering group that you have put a lot of  thought into it, 
that you’re clever, and in a situation like that [in front of  the steering group] you don’t want 
to expose logical errors, mental errors, etc. 
The respondent said that her experience of  steering groups is that they usually lack 
knowledge of  IT product development in general, and of  the situation at hand. The 
fact that the steering group consists of  several people, where many are unknown to 
you and few have a good insight into the situation creates the dilemma.  
It is crucial how you create the project’s steering group. Problems in the steering of  my projects 
have often stemmed from a lack of  commitment in the steering groups. The purpose of  
steering groups is to make way for the project, to allow you to work without interruption, to 
create acceptance for the project, to obtain more resources. [...] They are to give guidance 
regarding a change of  path and so on. If  unexpected events occur forcing you to rethink or 
redirect, then they are the ones to make that decision. 
Another respondent said that there are typical situations when project managers 
don’t inform the steering group of  what’s going on: 
The same old same old, you have a deadline that you don’t believe in, or other problems you 
don’t want to reveal to the steering group. Times when you want a limited view of  the project. 
Project managers always expose only some of  the perspectives of  their projects to others, 
including their steering groups. [...] This [selection of  perspectives] does not in itself  imply 
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deceit, as a project manager simply cannot show the steering group the image of  the whole 
project, it’s impossible. 
One respondent focused on the need for agreement: 
One difference between a review such as this and a steering group is that you have to reach 
agreement with your steering group. The steering group is something you have to obey, but in 
respect of  a review such as this, that is not the case. [...] A steering group is not as 
questioning, they never ask ’why did you choose to put this activity before that one’, or ’why 
did you choose these three objects of  delivery’. You can be provocative in a review such as this, 
forcing the project manager to explain his/her decisions, and you don’t have to reach 
agreement about it. I say it is of  more use to you, as the project manager, to have to think 
carefully. 
One respondent said that the purpose of  PIAs was to “check the use of  ideas” and “get 
help in writing the requirements specification before starting the project”. When asked later on if  
PIAs had worked, she answered that they had: 
Sometimes you are so focused on what you are supposed to do. You are so focused on satisfying 
the customer, and that can lead to forgetting some things. [...] If  you don’t have a standard, 
and you have to start from scratch, during every project start-up, you tend to care about what 
comes to mind, to include this and that and then you might forget some other things. [...] You 
remember what went wrong earlier, but you forget to identify the things that went well. 
10 Conclusions 
The project managers in this study report that one important element of  the project 
support structure, the steering groups, is not suited to all kinds of  problems during 
project management. In fact, some of  the project managers disclose that they are, at 
times, far from revealing all facts dishonest to their steering groups. Other project 
managers candidly report that you ‘dress things up’ in front of  the steering group, 
trying to present a more polished picture of  your project, at least up to the point of  
running into trouble when you inform them in order to make them act. Honesty 
does not rule the relationship between the project manager and the steering 
committee. Model I reasoning does. 
Unchallenging model I reasoning and single-loop learning is the dominant mode 
when struggling through the workday. Double-loop learning, changing the reasoning 
behind your actions, is time and energy consuming, challenging, and at times hurtful. 
Dialogues during the PIAs sometimes cover sensitive topics such as what people 
have said, what people have done, and what you are to make of  that. Project 
managers reveal what they think of  others and what they think of  their own actions. 
They allow themselves to be challenged, and, at times, this reflection causes a clearly 
identifiable change of  action by the project manager. Model II reasoning allows 
reflection and double-loop learning to occur. 
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The purpose of  this study was to make an initial exploration of  the PIA method and 
to investigate how it deals with the three presented dilemmas; (i) is there a need for 
reflection regarding the items of  the two agendas of  the project manager; (ii) do the 
project managers accept the support of  the PIA auditor and is Model II reasoning 
achieved, and (iii) will management deploy PIAs? 
To start with (iii), management has obviously deployed PIAs. Its explanation for this 
decision is the need to support project managers during the early project phase; just 
why conventional project management methods are unsuited to providing this 
support is not elaborated upon. The attitude of  management can be characterized 
thus; ‘The PIA is a bit strange, and was not my idea, but as long as the project 
managers say it works, it’s fine by me’. This finding supports the initial proposal that 
management is reluctant to admit to any difference of  interests in the projects and 
their environment. This could in turn be caused by the tradition of  viewing the 
organization as a rational design (Morgan, 1997). Management says it trusts project 
managers to be loyal, which is probably a prerequisite for the deployment of  a 
method such as PIA, which unilaterally increase learning through reflection. 
Turning to (ii), all the interviewed project managers, as well as all the project 
managers who responded to the survey, found PIAs to be supportive. The PIA 
auditor categorized Model II reasoning as when project-related topics could be 
discussed with no resistance, and found this to occur during most audits. However, 
the PIA auditor reports that Model II reasoning was never achieved in situations 
where there were three people present, and that a few project managers were difficult 
to invite into Model II. Those who eventually turned to Model II and received 
another audit would, however, quickly get into Model II the second time, indicating 
that the trust needed for Model II is present. 
Again, the project managers found the PIAs to be supportive with the survey 
indicating that PIAs increased the project managers’ understanding of  their projects. 
The interviewed project managers viewed the PIA as an opportunity to double-check 
the project design before it was scrutinized by the other project management support 
systems, e.g. the steering group and the quality audits. Obviously, the project 
managers see a need to control what is perceived by these conventional support 
systems. Some project managers gave examples of  how they needed to manage the 
impressions of  the project.  
The PIA auditor reported that reflecting did not provide much ‘pay off ’ as regards 
the detailed planning of  the project, but was much needed as regards the initial 
proposal received from the customer and the overall design of  the project. The PIA 
auditor also reported some occurrences of  projects that got stuck early on when the 
project managers recognized political opposition from unfriendly interest owners 
inside the Company. Following reflection, these project managers realised that they 
could either fight back politically or expose the resistance, two tactics that had not 
been considered before the audits. More than just a few project managers seem to 
perceive occurrences of  political resistance and other kinds of  non-supportive 
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behaviour as kinds of  organizational bugs, and that these bugs must be fixed by 
management before project work can continue. The possibility of  finding a 
temporary workaround was reflected upon when situations like these were discussed. 
This study supports the existence of  the objective inside versus the subjective outside 
paradox in the management of  projects. It indicates that reflection through Model II 
reasoning can be formally organized, if  this organization recognizes the paradox and 
the need for the trust required for Model II. The existence of  the paradox has 
implications for designers of  any kind of  control system for project management; 
the project managers, who are subject to the control system, will try to manage how 
the control system perceives the project. 
Perhaps the setting of  The Company is peculiar; perhaps it all would be different in 
an organization where steering groups are manned to a greater extent by people 
skilled in project management. Bearing in mind the quotation by Buchanan and 
Huczynskij (1997) in the introduction to this article, The Company is not that 
peculiar. A project manager cannot always expect the context of  his/her project to 
be supportive and predictable. Some irrationality will always exist, e.g. organizational 
politics in competition for scant resources, uncertainty regarding the interpretation 
of  top management directives, or rivalry between line and project managers. PIAs are 
an example of  a project management method, which enables reflection and learning 
by project managers as regards such matters. Conventional project management 
methods, such as guidance by steering groups and knowledge stored in rules and 
guidelines, have failed to provide such support. 
Reflective project leadership (Ollila, 2000) is a method which creates learning 
through reflection in a non-disclosing setting containing two people. When 
comparing the PIA method to reflective project leadership, an important distinction 
becomes apparent. In Reflective project leadership, the auditor is not professionally 
competent as regards the task of  the audited leader, while the PIA auditor has 
professional experience. This makes PIAs an arena for also transferring knowledge 
betweens auditees by means of  knowledge broking (Hellström, Malmquist, & 
Mikaelsson, 2001). This might prove to be an important alternative mechanism in 
situations where deeper learning and reflection are either undesirable or impossible 
to achieve. 
It is difficult to precisely chisel out the circumstances required to enable a project 
management support organization like the PIAs to enhance Model II reasoning. The 
PIA auditor’s reporting of  failures during audits when three people were present, and 
the criticism of  Action Science’s group counselling (Kemmis & McTaggart, 2000) 
indicate that a one-on-one setting is preferable. One-on-one project audits, other 
than PIAs, have been occurring at the Company for years. The focus of  those audits, 
however, has been compliance, with project managers aware that those audits would 
disclose any project which did not, in the end, comply. We can expect employees to 
be unwilling to share information that puts them in a bad light (Downs, 1967 p272), 
and, under such threatening audits, it is naïve to believe that deeper, double-loop 
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learning would occur, regardless of  the ambitions of  the auditor. In his doctoral 
thesis, Westling (2002) shows that many kinds of  project meetings are arenas which 
host activities such as impression management and the practice of  symbolic 
leadership rather than information-sharing and decision-making. Instead, much of  
the information-sharing and decision-making takes place backstage. We cannot 
expect Model II reasoning to occur during steering group meetings or during 
disclosing audits. Those arenas are not staged for learning, but for performance. 
Argyris’ et al (1985) proposed method of  learning through Model II reasoning, 
Action Science, consists of  an arena containing several participants. While this study 
does not challenge the notion of  creating learning in large groups per se, it shows 
that such learning can be achieved quickly when the group is reduced to a couple of  
people, a facilitator and a participant, and that the necessary confidence takes, at 
least, much more time to develop when the group is extended. Argyris’ idea that the 
change into Model II reasoning is to be initiated by management may not always be 
adequate; some group situations may instead make you perform in order to avoid 
embarrassment, and as a result your performance is Model I reasoning causing 
erroneous decisions in the short run and defensive attitudes in the long run. 
Our findings show that the practice of  project management is better served by an 
understanding of  the interests of  the different actors of  the organization, and the 
recognition that the interests of  individuals deviates at times from the overall goals 
of  the organization. It proposes that learning arenas may be served by reducing the 
influence of  the traditional hierarchical system of  power. Project managers are aware 
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